img

QQ群聊

img

官方微信

高级检索

黄金科学技术 ›› 2023, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (5): 811-822.doi: 10.11872/j.issn.1005-2518.2023.05.020

• 采选技术与矿山管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

自愿性环境规制对资源型企业高管薪酬的影响研究

郑明贵1,2(),邱均远1(),顾东明1,林玉华1   

  1. 1.江西理工大学矿业发展研究中心,江西 赣州 341000
    2.中国科学技术大学管理学院,安徽 合肥 230026
  • 收稿日期:2023-02-05 修回日期:2023-07-07 出版日期:2023-10-31 发布日期:2023-11-21
  • 通讯作者: 邱均远 E-mail:mgz268@sina.com;serendipity2157@163.com
  • 作者简介:郑明贵(1978-),男,安徽颍上人,教授,博士生导师,从事资源经济与管理研究工作。mgz268@sina.com
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金项目“中国战略性矿产资源产业链供应链安全稳定战略研究(2025—2060)”(22XGL003);国家自然科学基金重点项目“大数据环境下的评价理论、方法和应用”(71631006);江西理工大学重大项目培育计划“大数据驱动下国家矿产资源安全战略管理现代化研究”(19ZDPY-08)

Impact of Voluntary Environmental Regulations on Executive Compensation of Resource-based Enterprises in China

Minggui ZHENG1,2(),Junyuan QIU1(),Dongming GU1,Yuhua LIN1   

  1. 1.Research Center of Mining Development, Jiangxi University of Science and Technology, Ganzhou 341000, Jiangxi, China
    2.School of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, Anhui, China
  • Received:2023-02-05 Revised:2023-07-07 Online:2023-10-31 Published:2023-11-21
  • Contact: Junyuan QIU E-mail:mgz268@sina.com;serendipity2157@163.com

摘要:

随着自愿性环境规制日趋普遍,其会如何影响企业高管薪酬成为一个重要研究课题。通过构建自愿性环境规制与企业高管薪酬理论模型,选取2011—2020年中国资源型上市企业作为研究样本,对自愿性环境规制与企业高管薪酬的关系进行了实证检验,同时考察了代理成本和经理人市场对自愿性环境规制与高管薪酬关系的权变影响。研究发现:(1)实施自愿性环境规制能够正向影响资源型企业高管薪酬,对于非国有、大规模和年轻企业,实施自愿性环境规制所带来的高管薪酬激励作用更显著;(2)代理成本对自愿性环境规制与高管薪酬的关系起负向调节作用,但经理人市场起正向调节作用。将自愿性环境规制纳入高管薪酬的研究范畴是对高管薪酬领域研究的丰富和拓展,为降低代理成本,推动经理人市场发展提供了经验证据。

关键词: 自愿性环境规制, 高管薪酬, 代理成本, 经理人市场, 资源型企业

Abstract:

With the increasing popularity of voluntary environmental regulation,how it will affect executive compensation in enterprises has become an important research topic.A theoretical model of voluntary environmental regulations and executive compensation was constructed,it selected Chinese resource-based listed enterprises from 2011 to 2020 as research samples,and empirically examined the relationship between voluntary environmental regulations and executive compensation.It also investigated the moderating effects of agency costs and the managerial labor market on the relationship between voluntary environmental regulations and executive compensation.The study findings are as follows:(1)The implementation of voluntary environ-mental regulations has a positive impact on executive compensation in resource-based enterprises,and the incentive effect of voluntary environmental regulations on executive compensation is more significant for non-state-owned,large-scale,and young enterprises.(2)Agency costs have a negative moderating effect on the relationship between voluntary environmental regulations and executive compensation,while the managerial labor market has a positive moderating effect.By incorporating voluntary environmental regulations into the study of executive compensation,this article enriches and expands the research in the field of executive compensation and provides empirical evidence for reducing agency costs and promoting the development of the managerial labor market.

Key words: voluntary environmental regulations, executive compensation, agency costs, managerial labor market, resource-based enterprises

中图分类号: 

  • F272

图1

自愿性环境规制与高管薪酬的理论模型"

表1

资源型行业代码及名称"

代码名称代码名称
B06煤炭开采和洗选业C25石油加工及炼焦业
B07石油和天然气开采业C26化学原料和化学制品制造业
B08黑色金属矿采选业C30非金属矿物制品业
B09有色金属矿采选业C31黑色金属冶炼和压延加工业
B10非金属矿采选业C32有色金属冶炼和压延加工业
D44电力和热力生产供应业C33金属制品业

表2

变量定义"

变量名称符号变量类型度量
高管薪酬lnGGXC被解释变量前3名高管薪酬总额的自然对数
自愿性环境规制ISO14001解释变量通过环境管理体系认证为1,否则为0
代理成本ATO调节变量总资产周转率
经理人市场Market调节变量樊纲市场化指数总得分
企业规模Size控制变量公司总资产取自然对数
资产负债率Lev控制变量总负债/总资产
企业绩效ROA控制变量净利润/总资产平均余额
现金流比率Cashflow控制变量经营活动现金流净额/总资产
董事人数Board控制变量董事会人数取自然对数
独立董事比例Indep控制变量独立董事人数除以董事人数
两职合一Dual控制变量董事长与总经理是同一人赋值为1,否则为0
账面市值比BM控制变量账面价值/总市值
托宾Q值TobinQ控制变量(流通股市值+非流通股股份数×每股净资产+负债账面值)/总资产
是否国有企业SOE控制变量国有企业为1,否则为0
公司年龄Firmage控制变量企业成立年限取自然对数
第一大股东持股比例Top1控制变量第一大股东持股数/期末总股数
管理层持股比例Mshare控制变量管理层持股数/总股本
行业虚拟变量Ind控制变量根据证监会行业分类标准,设置11个虚拟变量
年份虚拟变量Year控制变量样本区间为10年,设置9个虚拟变量

表3

主要变量描述性统计"

变量样本数/个均值标准差最小值最大值
lnGGXC4 47914.3500.66112.76016.320
ISO140014 4790.2570.43701.000
ATO4 4790.7140.5330.0087.871
Market4 4797.7851.9872.87010.990
Size4 47922.4601.43320.16026.420
Lev4 4790.4460.2050.0590.913
ROA4 4790.0400.055-0.1560.210
Cashflow4 4790.0580.064-0.1200.241
Board4 4782.1600.2071.6092.708
Indep4 4780.3700.0500.3330.556
Dual4 4330.2160.41201.000
BM4 4791.2711.3140.1217.090
TobinQ4 3861.7380.9230.8376.002
SOE4 4790.4510.49801.000
FirmAge4 4792.8550.3271.7923.466
Top14 4790.3640.1510.1000.794
Mshare4 3270.1270.20100.672

表4

主要变量相关系数"

变量lnGGXCISO14001ATOMarketSizeLevROACashflow
lnGGXC1
ISO140010.096***1
ATO0.034**0.066***1
Market0.285***0.080***0.086***1
Size0.340***0.004-0.056***-0.127***1
Lev-0.020-0.037**-0.039***-0.230***0.523***1
ROA0.299***0.027*0.149***0.191***-0.102***-0.456***1
Cashflow0.238***0.031**0.062***0.086***0.149***-0.068***0.374***1
BM0.087***-0.036**-0.088***-0.172***0.690***0.582***-0.280***0.017
TobinQ-0.083***-0.0160.0200.070***-0.488***-0.293***0.135***0.009
FirmAge0.217***-0.027*-0.0230.036**0.181***0.153***-0.048***0.122***
SOE-0.060***-0.046***-0.021-0.346***0.474***0.392***-0.233***0.068***
Top1-0.043***-0.0240.044***-0.066***0.320***0.133***0.0090.084***
Mshare-0.075***0.032**0.0230.274***-0.428***-0.377***0.240***-0.082***
Dual-0.034**-0.0070.0050.204***-0.243***-0.142***0.061***-0.050***
Indep-0.0140.005-0.027*0.039***-0.022-0.027*-0.022-0.012
Board0.053***-0.032**-0.006-0.175***0.349***0.264***-0.073***0.047***
变量BMTobinQFirmAgeSOETop1MshareDualIndep
BM1
TobinQ-0.502***1
FirmAge0.191***-0.0081
SOE0.422***-0.206***0.214***1
Top10.203***-0.200***-0.099***0.282***1
Mshare-0.318***0.084***-0.274***-0.547***-0.139***1
Dual-0.151***0.082***-0.080***-0.307***-0.069***0.231***1
Indep-0.0110.069***0.037**-0.031**0.031**0.035**0.080***1
Board0.260***-0.177***0.0200.304***0.064***-0.223***-0.149***-0.492***

表5

回归结果"

变量基准模型调节效应模型
(1)(2)(3)(4)
lnGGXClnGGXCATOMarket
ATO

0.075***

(4.12)

ISO14001×ATO

-0.132***

(-3.42)

Market

0.059***

(11.26)

ISO14001×Market

0.025***

(2.88)

Size

0.284***

(29.27)

0.293***

(27.30)

0.296***

(27.70)

0.277***

(26.53)

Lev

-0.211***

(-3.65)

-0.145**

(-2.52)

-0.148**

(-2.57)

-0.092

(-1.62)

ROA

2.773***

(13.42)

2.397***

(11.57)

2.317***

(11.14)

2.397***

(11.84)

Cashflow

0.676***

(4.38)

0.513***

(3.31)

0.490***

(3.17)

0.436***

(2.86)

BM

-0.071***

(-7.47)

-0.084***

(-8.04)

-0.085***

(-8.06)

-0.071***

(-6.99)

TobinQ

0.015

(1.36)

0.049***

(4.25)

0.050***

(4.41)

0.041***

(3.70)

FirmAge

0.359***

(1.36)

0.236***

(7.92)

0.239***

(8.01)

0.227***

(7.78)

SOE

-0.292***

(-11.99)

-0.226***

(-9.15)

-0.226***

(-9.16)

-0.172***

(-6.92)

Top1

-0.555***

(-8.63)

-0.417***

(-6.43)

-0.414***

(-6.38)

-0.450***

(-6.95)

Mshare

-0.119**

(-2.11)

-0.151***

(-2.75)

-0.144***

(-2.64)

-0.230***

(-4.30)

Dual

0.028

(1.33)

0.022

(1.08)

0.024

(1.17)

-0.013

(-0.62)

Indep

-0.337*

(-1.81)

-0.359**

(-1.96)

-0.365**

(-2.00)

-0.280

(-1.56)

Board

-0.114**

(-2.31)

-0.032

(-0.65)

-0.032

(-0.65)

0.010

(0.21)

Constant

7.638***

(31.42)

7.228***

(26.08)

7.098***

(25.65)

7.118***

(26.38)

Observations4,1934,1934,1934,193
R20.3460.3920.3940.420
年份效应不控制控制控制控制
行业效应不控制控制控制控制

表6

稳健性检验"

变量高管薪酬总和对数更换数据董监高均值对数
(1)(2)(3)
lnGGXClnGGXClnMean
ISO14001

0.112***

(5.93)

0.001***

(3.77)

0.101***

(5.41)

ISO14001×ATO

0.001***

(-3.42)

-0.023***

(-2.27)

0.003***

(-2.97)

ISO14001×Market

0.004***

(2.88)

0.106**

(1.62)

0.005***

(2.82)

Constant

6.479***

(21.15)

7.080***

(18.01)

6.487***

(21.71)

Observations4 1932 0234 193
R20.3750.3940.399
控制变量控制控制控制
年份效应控制控制控制
行业效应控制控制控制

表7

PSM的平均处理效应"

因变量样本处理组控制组ATT标准差t
最近邻匹配lnGGXC匹配前14.46214.3130.1490.0236.39***
lnGGXC匹配后14.46214.3640.1160.0323.58***
半径匹配(0.05)lnGGXC匹配前14.46214.3130.1490.0236.39***
lnGGXC匹配后14.46214.3290.1330.0235.67***
核匹配lnGGXC匹配前14.46214.3130.1490.0236.39***
lnGGXC匹配后14.46214.3310.1320.0235.62***

表8

异质性检验"

变量产权性质企业规模企业成熟度
(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)
国有企业非国有企业小规模企业大规模企业成熟企业年轻企业
ISO14001

0.027

(1.01)

0.136***

(5.30)

0.047

(1.54)

0.140***

(5.98)

0.092***

(4.63)

0.138*

(1.94)

Constant

7.662***

(21.11)

5.742***

(11.93)

6.677***

(15.34)

6.069***

(11.84)

7.108***

(24.41)

6.058***

(3.19)

Observations1 8392 3541 7862 4073 963230
R20.4600.3820.4150.3290.3930.362
控制变量控制控制控制控制控制控制
年份效应控制控制控制控制控制控制
行业效应控制控制控制控制控制控制
Albuquerque A M, Franco G D, Verdi R S,2013.Peer choice in CEO compensation[J].Journal of Financial Economics,108(1):160-181.
Bansal P, Hunter T,2003.Strategic explanations for the early adoption of ISO 14001[J].Journal of Business Ethics,46(3):289-299.
Bu Xiaoning, Zhao Lihua,2022.Voluntary environmental regulations and enterprise pollution emission:Based on the empirical test of government energy-saving procurement policy[J].Finance Research,48(4):49-63.
Chen Jing, Fang Junxiong,2020.High-speed railway,managerial labor market and executive compensation[J].Finance and Trade Economics,41(12):132-146.
Chen Shiting, Hong Jianqiao,2021.Is there a performance reference for executive compensation in Chinese private firms?—An Empirical analysis based on CEO market explanation[J].Economic Theory and Economic Management,41(4):68-82.
Dai X, Gao F, Lisic L L,et al,2021.Corporate social performance and the managerial labor market[J].Review of Accounting Studies,28:307-339.
Fan Gang, Wang Xiaolu, Ma Guangrong,2011.Contribution of marketization to China’s economic growth[J].Economic Research,46(9):4-16.
Fang Jie, Wen Zhonglin,2022.Moderation analysis and its effect size based on a two-level regression model [J].Advances in Psychological Science,30(5):1183-1190.
Gertler M,1992.Financial capacity and output fluctuations in an economy with multi-period financial relationships[J].The Review of Economic Studies,59(3):455-472.
Guo Yating, Zhao Le,2022.Research on colleague death and executive compensation self-interest under fear management theory [J].Financial Review,14(5):31-48,124.
Han Yanjin,2021.Strategic deviance and executive compensation—A new evidence from the efficient contract theory[J].Scientific Research Management,42(2):181-189.
Hao Ying, Huang Yuxiu, Ning Chong,et al,2020.Corporate reputation and executive compensation:Public service or career reputation[J].Financial Research,(10):189-206.
Hu Zhiliang, Zheng Minggui,2022.Do corporate strategic differences affect commercial credit financing?—Analysis of the regulatory effects based on scale discrimination and industry characteristics [J].Management Review,34(6):292-302.
Huang Yongchun, Chao Yifang, Peng Rong,2022.Executive team pay gap,enterprise strategic change and breakthrough innovation—The regulating role of internal control[J].Science of Science and Management of Science and Technology,43(5):161-177.
Jensen M C, Kevin J,1990.Murphy Performance pay and top-management incentives[J].Journal of Political Economy,98(2):225-264.
Jensen M C, Meckling W H,1976.Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior,agency costs and ownership structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,3(4):305-360.
Li Qiang, Feng Bo,2015.Study on the relationship between executive incentive and quality of environmental information disclosure—Based on the moderating effects of government and market[J].Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics,37(2):93-104.
Li Wenjing, Cen Yongsi, Hu Yuming,2014.Does external pay gap encourage top management?An empirical study based on managerial market and ownership type[J].Nankai Management Review,17(4):24-35.
Liang Dan,2019.Firm size,market power and innovation under the perspective of new empirical industrial organization[J].Industrial Economics Review,(5):59-76.
Lucas R E,1978.On the size distribution of business firms[J].The Bell Journal of Economics,9(2):508-523.
Mueller D C,1969.A theory of conglomerate mergers[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,83(4):643-659.
Pan Zicheng,2020.Is there a peer effect in executive compensation?[J].Business Economics and Management,(5):62-76.
Qi Yongjun, Zhang Xiaoyu,2022.Management share selling,investor sentiment and company stock dividend:Based on comparison before and after the government supervision[J].Scientific Decision Making,(1):1-20.
Qu Kai,2021.Research on the effect of environmental regulation on enterprise green technology innovation[J].Journal of Hunan University of Science and Technology (Social Science Edition),24(6):90-99.
Rao Yulei, Guo Lian, Peng Diefeng,2022.Do local CEOs prefer local auditors?—From the perspective of audit collusion[J].Audit Research,(1):82-93.
Ren Guangqian, Zhou Xueya, Liu Li,et al,2020.Executive com-pensation,comparison effect and agency cost[J].Journal of Central University of Finance and Economics,(7):71-78.
Ren Shenggang, Xiang Qiulian, He Duojun,2018.Can voluntary environmental regulation promote firm’s green innovation?—The case of ISO14001 standard[J].Research and Development Management,30(6):1-11.
Ruan Min, Xiao Feng,2022.Voluntary participatory environmental regulation and enterprise technological innovation:The moderating effect of public attention and market process[J].Science and Technology Progress and Countermeasures,39(2):79-90.
Shahab Y, Ntim C G, Chen Y G,et al,2020.Chief executive officer attributes,sustainable performance,environmental performance,and environmental reporting:New insights from upper echelons perspective[J].Business Strategy and the Environment,29(1):1-16.
Shanmugam R K, Dhingra T,2023.Outcome-based contracts—Linking technology,ownership and reputations[J].International Journal of Information Management,70:102624.doi:10.1016/j.ijinfomgt.2023.102624 .
doi: 10.1016/j.ijinfomgt.2023.102624
Sun Duojiao, Yan Zhenli,2022.Incentive Target heterogeneity and executive compensation contracts—Evidence from the classification of SOEs[J].Journal of Beijing Technology and Business University (Social Science Edition),37(2):59 -72,113.
Sun Tao, Luan Xiangru,2022.The “Double-Edged Sword” effect of diversification strategy on the development of enterprise groups[J].Modern Economic Discussion,(10):85-95.
Tang Guoping, Sun Hongfeng,2022.Environmental regulation,risk compensation and executive compensation:Empirical evidence based on the implementation of the new environmental protection law [J].Economic Management,44(7):140-158.
Wang Fenmian, He Jia, Sun Wanlin,2021.Mandatory environmental regulation,ISO 14001 certification and green innovation:A quasi-natural experiment based on Chinese Ambient Air Quality Standards 2012 [J].China Soft Science,(9):105-118.
Wang Xiaohong, Hu Shilei,2022.Does university-industry collaboration improve the technological innovation performance of manufacturing firms?An empirical study based on propensity score matching method[J].Technological Economy,41(4):30-43.
Wen Xiaoman,2019.Social Security Fund’s Shareholding,Agency Costs and Executive Compensation[D].Lanzhou:Northwest Normal University.
Xiao Jihui, Meng Ting,2015.Research on asymmetric performance benchmarks and executive compensation:Based on agency cost perspective[J].Management Review,27(1):194-208.
Yin Zhujia, Zeng Hao, Mao Chenxu,2018.Board networks and financing constraints:Governance effect and information effect[J].Finance and Trade Economics,39(11):112-127.
Yu Lianchao, Bi Qian,2021a.Can environmental management system certification curb the risk of stock price crash? [J].Business Economics and Management,(8):55-69.
Yu Lianchao, Bi Qian, Liu Qiang,2021b.Can environmental management system certification improve corporate investment efficiency?[J].Modern Finance and Economics(Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics),41(12):78-93.
Yu Lianchao, Dong Jinting, Wang Lei,et al,2021c.Does environmental management system certification help alleviate corporate financing constraints? [J].Auditing and Economic Research,36(6):116-126.
Yu Lianchao, Dong Jinting, Zhang Weiguo,et al,2022.Research on the impact of ISO14001 environmental certification on firms total factor productivity[J].Journal of Management,19(9):1280-1287.
Zhai Shuping, Mao Wenxia, Han Xian,2022.Colleagues’ death and executive compensation:An analysis based on the terror management theory[J].Economic Management,44(9):151-168.
Zhang Aimei, Li Xiabing, Jin Jie,et al,2021.Environmental regulation,agency cost and corporate performance—Empirical evidence from listed companies in the chemical industry[J].Accounting Research,(8):83-93.
Zhang Chi,2021.Theoretical exploration of executive compensation research in state-owned enterprises[J].Learning and Exploration,(5):109-118.
Zhang Zhiwei, Zhang Dayong, Ji Qiang,et al,2022.Media coverage and earnings management of commercial banks[J] Management Review,34(10):67-78,133.
Zheng Minggui, Dong Juan, Zhong Changbiao,2022.Influence mechanism of capital deepening on total factor productivity of resource-based enterprises[J].Resource Science,44(3):536-553.
步晓宁,赵丽华,2022.自愿性环境规制与企业污染排放——基于政府节能采购政策的实证检验[J].财经研究,48(4):49-63.
陈婧,方军雄,2020.高铁开通、经理人市场竞争与高管薪酬激励[J].财贸经济,41(12):132-146.
陈诗婷,洪剑峭,2021.我国民企高管薪酬存在业绩参照吗?——于经理人市场解释的实证分析[J].经济理论与经济管理,41(4):68-82.
樊纲,王小鲁,马光荣,2011.中国市场化进程对经济增长的贡献[J].经济研究,46(9):4-16.
方杰,温忠麟,2022.基于两水平回归模型的调节效应分析及其效应量[J].心理科学进展,30(5):1183-1190.
郭雅婷,赵乐,2022.恐惧管理理论下同事离世与高管薪酬自利研究[J].金融评论,14(5):31-48,124.
韩艳锦,2021.企业战略差异度与高管薪酬——来自效率契约说的新证据[J].科研管理,42(2):181-189.
郝颖,黄雨秀,宁冲,等,2020.公司社会声望与高管薪酬:公共服务抑或职业声誉[J].金融研究,(10):189-206.
胡志亮,郑明贵,2022.企业战略差异影响了商业信用融资吗?——基于规模歧视、行业特征的调节效应分析[J].管理评论,34(6):292-302.
黄永春,晁一方,彭荣,2022.高管团队薪酬差距、企业战略变革与突破性创新——内部控制的调节作用[J].科学学与科学技术管理,43(5):161-177.
黎文靖,岑永嗣,胡玉明,2014.外部薪酬差距激励了高管吗——基于中国上市公司经理人市场与产权性质的经验研究[J].南开管理评论,17(4):24-35.
李强,冯波,2015.高管激励与环境信息披露质量关系研究——基于政府和市场调节作用的视角[J].山西财经大学学报,37(2):93-104.
梁丹,2019.企业规模、市场势力与技术创新——基于新实证产业组织的视角[J].产业经济评论,(5):59-76.
潘子成,2020.高管薪酬存在同伴效应吗?[J].商业经济与管理,(5):62-76.
戚拥军,张晓宇,2022.高管减持、投资者情绪与公司送转行为:基于政府监管前后的比较[J].科学决策,(1):1-20.
屈凯,2021.环境规制的企业绿色技术创新效应研究[J].湖南科技大学学报(社会科学版),24(6):90-99.
饶育蕾,郭连,彭叠峰,2022.本地经理人更倾向于选择本地事务所吗?——从审计合谋的视角[J].审计研究,(1):82-93.
任广乾,周雪娅,刘莉,等,2020.高管薪酬、攀比效应与代理成本[J].中央财经大学学报,(7):71-78.
任胜钢,项秋莲,何朵军,2018.自愿型环境规制会促进企业绿色创新吗?——以ISO14001标准为例[J].研究与发展管理,30(6):1-11.
阮敏,肖风,2022.自愿参与型环境规制与企业技术创新——公众关注度和市场进程的调节作用[J].科技进步与对策,39(2):79-90.
孙多娇,闫珍丽,2022.激励目标异质性与高管薪酬契约——来自国有企业分类的经验证据[J].北京工商大学学报(社会科学版),37(2):59-72,113.
孙涛,栾翔茹,2022.多元化战略对企业集团发展的“双刃剑”效应[J].现代经济探讨,(10):85-95.
唐国平,孙洪锋,2022.环境规制、风险补偿与高管薪酬——基于《环境保护法》实施的经验证据[J].经济管理,44(7):140-158.
王分棉,贺佳,孙宛霖,2021.命令型环境规制、ISO 14001认证与企业绿色创新——基于《环境空气质量标准(2012)》的准自然实验[J].中国软科学,(9):105-118.
王晓红,胡士磊,2022.校企合作提升了制造业企业的技术创新绩效吗?——基于倾向得分匹配方法的实证研究[J].技术经济,41(4):30-43.
文小曼,2019.社保基金持股、代理成本与高管薪酬[D].兰州:西北师范大学.
肖继辉,孟婷,2015.非对称业绩基准与高管薪酬:基于代理成本视角[J].管理评论,27(1):194-208.
尹筑嘉,曾浩,毛晨旭,2018.董事网络缓解融资约束的机制:信息效应与治理效应[J].财贸经济,39(11):112-127.
于连超,毕茜,2021a.环境管理体系认证能够抑制股价崩盘风险吗?[J].商业经济与管理,(8):55-69.
于连超,毕茜,刘强,2021b.环境管理体系认证会提升企业投资效率吗?[J].现代财经(天津财经大学学报),41(12):78-93.
于连超,董晋亭,王雷,等,2021c.环境管理体系认证有助于缓解企业融资约束吗?[J].审计与经济研究,36(6):116-126.
于连超,董晋亭,张卫国,等,2022.ISO14001环境认证对企业全要素生产率的影响研究[J].管理学报,19(9):1280-1287.
翟淑萍,毛文霞,韩贤,2022.急功近利抑或行稳致远:CEO薪酬差距与企业研发效率——基于地理邻近性视角[J].经济管理,44(9):151-168.
张爱美,李夏冰,金杰,等,2021.环境规制、代理成本与公司绩效——来自化工行业上市公司的经验证据[J].会计研究,(8):83-93.
张弛,2021.国有企业高管薪酬研究的理论探索[J].学习与探索,(5):109-118.
张志伟,张大永,姬强,等,2022.媒体报道与商业银行盈余管理[J].管理评论,34(10):67-78,133.
郑明贵,董娟,钟昌标,2022.资本深化对中国资源型企业全要素生产率的影响[J].资源科学,44(3):536-553.
[1] 郑明贵,陶思敏,彭群婷,刘丽珍. 企业社会责任、人力资本质量与中国资源型企业绩效[J]. 黄金科学技术, 2023, 31(3): 464-476.
Viewed
Full text


Abstract

Cited

  Shared   
  Discussed   
No Suggested Reading articles found!